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McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 We are asked to grant certiorari review of a decision of 
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands that reinstated 
contractual claims that arose from the sale of a bar in the 
islands.  The Superior Court of the Virgin Islands dismissed 
the suit in April of 2015 based on Plaintiffs’ failure to post a 
security bond.  The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
thereafter reversed that decision and reinstated the suit based 
upon its conclusion that the provision of Virgin Islands law 
allowing a court to order nonresident plaintiffs to post such a 
bond violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.   
 Defendants now ask us to reverse the Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands pursuant to our certiorari authority to review 
that court’s final decisions.  Congress enacted H.R. 6116 in 
order to revoke that authority for all “cases commenced on or 
after” December 28, 2012.1  We must decide whether “cases,” 
as used in H.R. 6116, was intended to apply to all suits initiated 
in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, the court of original 
jurisdiction, or whether it was intended to apply to appeals 
from final decisions of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
that were filed on or after that date irrespective of when the suit 
was filed. 
 We previously addressed this issue in United Industrial 
Service, Transportation, Professional and Government 
Workers of North America Seafarers International Union ex 
rel. Bason v. Government of the Virgin Islands.2  We have 
                                                 
 
1 Act of Dec. 28, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-226, 126 Stat. 
1606 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1613 and 28 U.S.C. § 1260) 
[hereinafter H.R. 6116]. 
2 United Indus., Serv., Transp., Prof’l & Gov’t 
Workers of N. Am. Seafarers Int’l Union ex rel. Bason v. 





granted initial hearing en banc in this matter to revisit the 
jurisdictional issue we decided in Bason.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we now conclude that Bason incorrectly 
interpreted H.R. 6116 as referring to suits filed in the Superior 
Court of the Virgin Islands on or after December 28, 2012.  We 
now hold that Congress intended for the effective date for H.R. 
6116 to apply to the date an appeal from a final decision of the 
Virgin Islands Supreme Court is filed and not to the date a suit 
is filed in the Superior Court.  Since the petition in this matter 
was filed after the effective date of H.R. 6116, we hold that we 
lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal.  Accordingly, we will 
dismiss the petition for certiorari review.3  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Factual and Procedural History 
In 2003, Plaintiffs Joseph Gerace and Victoria Vooys 
purchased Cane Bay Beach Bar, which is situated on the island 
of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands.  In 2005, they sued 
Defendants Warren Mosler, Chris Hanley, Chrismos Cane Bay 
LLC, and others in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for 
breach of contract and other claims related to the sale of that 
business.  Plaintiffs resided in the U.S. Virgin Islands from the 
time they filed their suit until the fall of 2012, when they 
moved to the U.S. mainland.  Their suit was still pending when 
they relocated.  Upon learning that Plaintiffs were no longer 
Virgin Islands residents, Defendants petitioned the Superior 
Court for an order requiring Plaintiffs to post a security bond 
for potential costs pursuant to title 5, section 547 of the Virgin 
Islands Code.4  That provision allows defendants to demand 
that nonresident plaintiffs post a bond to cover potential costs 
of litigation and allows a court to stay litigation until the bond 
                                                 
 
3 Although we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to 
review the decision of the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands in this matter, we clearly have jurisdiction to decide 
the underlying question of our jurisdiction.  See Chicot Cty. 
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 
(1940) (Federal courts have authority “to determine whether 
or not they have jurisdiction to . . . construe and apply the 
statute under which they are asked to act.”).  




is paid.5  The court granted Defendants’ request in April of 
2013 and ordered Plaintiffs to post a bond of $1,050 each 
within thirty days of the order.     
Defendants moved to dismiss after Plaintiffs failed to 
meet that deadline.6  Plaintiffs vehemently opposed the motion, 
arguing, inter alia, that the Virgin Islands nonresident bond 
provision was unconstitutional.  In April 2015—almost three 
years after H.R. 6116 became law—the Superior Court 
rejected Plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of the 
nonresident bond requirement and dismissed the suit.     
Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands.  In August 2016, that court reversed the decision of the 
Superior Court and reinstated the complaint.  Defendants 
appealed that decision to this Court and we granted certiorari 
review in March of 2017.  However, after a panel of this Court 
heard the parties’ arguments on the merits, we issued a sua 
sponte order for initial hearing en banc to reexamine whether 
Congress intended us to retain certiorari jurisdiction over 
appeals filed after the effective date of H.R. 6116. 
We now hold that our certiorari jurisdiction to review 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands does not 
extend to any appeal that was filed on or after the date that H.R. 
6116 became law.  Before we discuss the merits of that 
jurisdictional issue, we will place our decision into its 
historical context and explain the evolution of our relationship 
to the Virgin Islands judicial system.  
B. Historical Background 
1. Virgin Islands Courts and the Third Circuit’s 
Certiorari Jurisdiction 
In 1917, the United States purchased what was then the 
Danish West Indies from Denmark “in exchange for $25 
million in gold and American recognition of Denmark’s claim 
to Greenland.”7  Judicial oversight of what became the U.S. 
                                                 
 
5 Id. § 547(a). 
6 See id. § 547(d) (enabling court to dismiss an action 
upon nonpayment of bond). 
7 Robert M. Jarvis, “A Peculiar Niche”: Admiralty 
Law in the United States Virgin Islands, 26 J. Mar. L. & Com. 




                                                 
 
West Indies, U.S.-Den., Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706.  A series 
of natural, political and social events had made the islands 
much less attractive and less valuable to Denmark.  These 
included the introduction of steam vessels that no longer 
needed to “tranship at [St.] Thomas,” a “precipitous fall in 
global sugar prices, . . . droughts, [the] development of the 
sugar beet in Europe, and an unusually large number of 
hurricanes.”  Jarvis, supra, at 160.  The islands also lost much 
of their commercial value with the end of slavery.  “Although 
Denmark banned slavery in 1802 . . . , it was not until July 3, 
1848 that [the Governor-General of the Danish West Indies] 
freed the islands’ slaves” on what is now celebrated in the 
Virgin Islands as Emancipation Day.  Id. at 160 n.12. 
Yet while the plan to purchase the Virgin Islands was 
formulated in 1916, official acquisition came after a long and 
arduous back-and-forth on the part of the U.S. Government.  
It began with Secretary of State William H. Seward signing a 
treaty with Denmark in 1867 for the purchase of St. Thomas 
and St. John.  Id. at 160 n.13.  Thereafter, the island of St. 
Thomas was flooded by a “tremendous tidal wave,” “[a] 
terrible earthquake shook it,” and opposition to the islands’ 
acquisition grew “after the ratification of the Alaska purchase, 
[which] added to the avalanche of objections” from Congress.  
Id.  However, the Danish Government was now “[s]o 
anxious” to consummate the sale that it was “ready to add the 
remaining island of [St. Croix] at a nominal price.”  Id.  
 
Much discussion, formal and informal, 
finally resulted in the signature of a Danish-
American treaty (January 24, 1902) for the 
purchase of the islands for $5,000,000. . . .  
[T]he Senate readily ratified the treaty, but the 
upper house of the Danish Parliament rejected it 
by one vote.  It was not until 1917 that both 
governments were able to exchange ratifications 
of a treaty of purchase; by then, in the 
atmosphere of war, the price had gone up to the 





Virgin Islands was promptly assigned to the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit by the Act of March 3, 1917.8  The 
pertinent provision—consisting of a mere thirty-five words—
provided: “In all cases arising in the . . . West Indian Islands 
and now reviewable by the courts of Denmark, writs of error 
and appeals shall be to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit . . . .”9 
Now home to a population of around 100,000, the U.S. 
Virgin Islands became an unincorporated American territory in 
1954.10  However, the evolution of the islands’ legal system 
and its relationship to the Third Circuit date back much further 
and are the result of numerous enactments by both the U.S. 
Congress and the Virgin Islands legislature.11  
 Professor Robert M. Jarvis, who has extensively 
studied the history of the Virgin Islands, has authored a 
detailed explanation for how we obtained jurisdiction over 
                                                 
 
Id. at 161 n.13 (quoting S. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the 
United States 399-403, 521 (3d ed. 1950)). 
8 Act of March 3, 1917, Pub. L. No. 64-389, ch. 171, § 
2, 39 Stat. 1132, 1133 (current version at 48 U.S.C. § 1392).   
9 Id. 
10 Revised Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 83-517, ch. 558, § 
2, 68 Stat. 497 (1954) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 
1541(a)).  An unincorporated territory is one that is not 
nearing statehood and whose subjects do not enjoy full 
constitutional guarantees. Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Bodle, 
427 F.2d 532, 533 n.1 (3d Cir. 1970).  For example, Virgin 
Islands residents are not permitted to vote in presidential 
elections, although they are U.S. citizens.  Ballentine v. 
United States, 486 F.3d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 2007). They are 
represented in Congress by a single non-voting delegate.  48 
U.S.C. § 1711. 
11 For a thorough history of Virgin Islands governance 
from 1906, while they were still a colony of Denmark, to 
Congress’s enactment of the legislation establishing the 
framework for modern Virgin Islands governance, see the 
opinion of U.S. District Court Judge Thomas K. Moore in 
Ballentine v. United States, No. Civ. 1999-130, 2001 WL 




the islands’ courts.12  According to Professor Jarvis, officials 
in the U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs originally “felt that the 
issue of the USVI appeals should be dealt with after the 
purchase of the islands was complete.”13  The Bureau’s 
Chief, Brigadier General Frank McIntyre, so testified before 
the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives in 1917: 
The Chairman:  What courts have they? 
Gen. McIntyre:  The courts are very 
simple.  In all the higher cases they have now a 
provision for appeal to Denmark.  For instance 
                                                 
 
12 See Jarvis, supra note 6, at 166 n.38.  Despite 
numerous inquiries that have been made into the issue, 
Professor Jarvis admits that the “question of why the Third 
Circuit, which sits in Philadelphia, was chosen is one that has 
baffled historians for years.”  Id.  However, the most probable 
explanation is that Delaware Senator Willard Saulsbury, Jr., 
inserted the language assigning the Virgin Islands to the Third 
Circuit at the last minute. Senator Saulsbury chaired the 
Committee on Coast and Insular Survey as well as the 
Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico.  Id. at 167 
n.38.  His “position put him in line to greatly influence the 
final wording of any bill.  Accordingly, it is very easy to 
believe that when it came time to decide what to do about 
appeals from the islands[,] Saulsbury was consulted and, as 
[Judge Albert Maris of the Third Circuit] suggests, 
[Saulsbury] recommended the Third Circuit as the best 
alternative available.”  Id. 
As Professor Jarvis explains, “Saulsbury would have 
been comfortable proposing the Third Circuit,” as “he had 
tried several cases before the court, including a difficult 
admiralty appeal.”  Id.  In any event, the timing of the 
insertion of the pertinent language—immediately before 
Easter recess—and the brevity of the key provision reinforces 
the argument that Senator Saulsbury could have provided for 
appeals to the Third Circuit with very little fanfare or notice.  
See infra note 17.   




the sheriff also exercises the office of judge.  
They have very few cases that go to Denmark. 
Mr. [William S.] Goodwin [D-Ark.]:  Are 
the decrees of the courts in English? 
Gen. McIntyre:  The records of the courts 
are written in Danish, and one of the difficulties 
is that most of the laws are in Danish.  A great 
many of them have not been translated. 
The Chairman:  It is necessary for us to 
make some provision for appeals? 
Gen. McIntyre:  I think not, because, I 
think, the proposition is simple, and I think that 
matter can be handled later after there has been a 
study and report on just exactly what you need. 
The Chairman:  And this bill gives the 
President the necessary authority? 
Gen. McIntyre:  Yes, sir.14   
 However, despite General McIntyre’s expressed desire 
to delay resolution of the issue of judicial oversight over the 
newly acquired islands, the move to grant the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit that authority was 
accomplished quickly and by insertion of the above-quoted 
thirty-five words into the legislation.15  The legislation was 
passed less than three weeks after General McIntyre 
testified.16   
                                                 
 
14 Id. (quoting Cession of Danish West Indian Islands: 
Hearings on H.R. 20755 Before the Comm. on Foreign 
Affairs, 64th Cong. 33 (1917) (testimony of Brigadier Gen. 
Frank McIntyre, Chief of U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs)).  
For a thorough discussion of the political structure of the 
Virgin Islands under Danish rule, see Ballentine, 2001 WL 
1242571, at *1-4. 
15 Jarvis, supra note 6, at 166 n.38; see Act of March 3, 
1917, ch. 171, § 2, 39 Stat. at 1133 (vesting Third Circuit 
with judicial authority over Virgin Islands cases). 




 For Congress, the choice of the Third Circuit may have 
been much less puzzling then than it appears to be today.  
The First Circuit already was supervising Puerto 
Rico.  The Second Circuit’s docket was 
overwhelmed with cases from New York.  The 
Fourth Circuit, with only two authorized judges, 
had been considered short-handed for years.  The 
Fifth Circuit, although geographically the closest 
circuit to the islands, was handling appeals from 
the District Court in the Panama Canal Zone. . . . 
[T]he remaining circuits . . . were simply too 
distant to provide effective oversight.  As such, 
Congress probably felt that there was no reason 
to wait for the results of the [study General 
McIntyre suggested be undertaken of the Virgin 
Islands courts] when the conclusion [Congress] 
was likely to draw was already clear.17  
 Moreover, resolution of the issue was no doubt 
facilitated by the fact that the legislation was introduced on 
the eve of a congressional recess.18  As Professor Jarvis 
explains, “[t]o the extent that Congress considered the matter 
. . . , the Third Circuit probably seemed like the logical 
choice.”19  That choice was likely also informed by 
geographic practicality.  With Philadelphia as its seat, judges 
of the Third Circuit could easily travel to the Virgin Islands, 
which in those days could be reached by steamer from 
                                                 
 
17 Jarvis, supra note 6, at 167 n.38.  In addition, the 
Eleventh Circuit did not yet exist.  It was not established until 
nearly fifty years later, in 1981.  Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, § 2, 
94 Stat. 1994, 1994 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41). 
18 Jarvis, supra note 6, at 166-67 n.38.  The bill to 
assign the Virgin Islands to the Third Circuit came up on 
March 3, 1917, just one day before the adjournment of the 
64th Congress on March 4, 1917.  See Act of March 3, 1917, 
ch. 171, § 2, 39 Stat. at 1133. 




neighboring New York.20, 21  
                                                 
 
20 Id. at 167 n.38 (citing Interview with Albert B. 
Maris, Circuit Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Apr. 
18, 1984) (transcript available from the Federal Judicial 
Center)).  It is almost certain that there was not great 
competition for authority over any aspect of the Virgin 
Islands.  The islands were not easy to reach for most circuit 
courts of appeals and they were not yet economically 
developed.  Jarvis, supra note 6, at 168 n.38. “[D]uring the 
early years of American rule[,] conditions actually worsened, 
and in 1928 a devastating hurricane swept over the islands.”  
Id.   
More critically, the judicial system in the Virgin 
Islands was considered to be “archaic.”  A Bill to Provide a 
Civil Government for the Virgin Islands, and for Other 
Purposes: Hearings on S. 2786 Before the S. Comm. on 
Territories and Insular Possessions, 68th Cong. 6 (1924) 
[hereinafter 1924 Senate Hearings] (statement of A. A. Berle, 
Jr., Counsel for the Virgin Islands Committee and the Virgin 
Islands branch of the American Federation of Labor).  It had 
been based on “an old Danish system, which even the Danes 
were about to revise.”  Id.  Accordingly, any move by Senator 
Saulsbury to place the judicial oversight of the Virgin Islands 
close to his home state of Delaware would have been met 
with much more apathy than opposition, and perhaps no small 
amount of relief.   
This began to change when Albert B. Maris was 
appointed to the Third Circuit.  He “was keenly interested” in 
the Virgin Islands and helped draft the Revised Organic Act, 
which is discussed below.  Jarvis, supra note 6, at 168 n.38; 
see infra note 26 and accompanying text.  Thereafter, he 
“oversaw the effort to codify the islands’ laws” and 
subsequently received the Virgin Islands Medal of Honor for 
his work improving and modernizing the Virgin Islands legal 
system.  Jarvis, supra note 6, at 168 n.38. 
The relationship between the Third Circuit and the 
Virgin Islands grew even stronger when President Truman 
appointed William H. Hastie to our Court.  Hastie had been 




                                                 
 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  With that 
appointment, he became the first African-American judge of a 
federal district court.  When President Truman appointed him 
to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, he then became 
the first African-American judge of a federal circuit court of 
appeals.  Given his service as a Virgin Islands governor and 
judge, “Hastie was well aware of the problems faced by the 
islands’ fledgling legal system. Thus, throughout his time on 
the Third Circuit (1949-76), Hastie sought to bring the 
[C]ourt closer to the islands.” Id. 
21 Despite the logic of Jarvis’s explanation, it is 
noteworthy that A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., who was a 
prominent jurist on this Court and a noted legal historian, had 
a different theory.  Judge Higginbotham believed the choice 
to assign the Virgin Islands to the Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit was largely the result of the hostile political and 
racial climate at the time.  In an interview for the Lyndon 
Baines Johnson Library Oral History Project, Judge 
Higginbotham opined that we were assigned jurisdiction over 
the Virgin Islands for “[t]he same reason why you have 
Puerto Rico in the First Circuit, which is Massachusetts.”  
Interview by Joe B. Frantz with A. Leon Higginbotham, 
Circuit Judge, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
Philadelphia, PA (Oct. 7, 1976) (transcript available from the 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Oral History Collection at 
http://www.lbjlibrary.net/assets/documents/archives/oral_hist
ories/higginbo/higginbo.pdf).  Judge Higginbotham 
explained:  
 
When the Virgin Islands became a U.S. 
possession it was then 90 per cent non-white, 
about 90 per cent black, and the closest circuit 
to it would be the Fifth, which is Alabama, 
Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Texas. 
With the degree of hostility between whites and 
blacks it was thought—so I understand, I have 
no documentation of it—that it would be better 
to have them in a different circuit.  And I 




However, the choice of the Third Circuit was not 
without criticism.  Just seven years later, in 1924, A. A. 
Berle, Jr., who was counsel for the Virgin Islands Committee 
and for the Virgin Islands branch of the American Federation 
of Labor, advocated for a different venue in his testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Territories and Insular 
                                                 
 
Fourth Circuit, which is Virginia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, and maybe also South Carolina, 
or the Fifth were geographically closer. 
 
Id.   
However, when viewed in context with then 
current events, it is not at all certain that legislators 
would have been concerned about the racial 
demographics of the Virgin Islands when deciding 
which Court of Appeals to assign them to. President 
Woodrow Wilson had already begun segregating the 
federal government around the time of the U.S.’s 
annexation of the Virgin Islands.  See Kathleen L. 
Wolgemuth, Woodrow Wilson and Federal 
Segregation, 44 J. Negro Hist. 158, 161 (1959) (noting 
that under President Wilson’s administration, “[b]y the 
end of 1913, segregation had been realized in the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, the Post Office 
Department, the Office of the Auditor for the Post 
Office, and had even begun in the City Post Office in 
Washington, D.C.”); id. (stating that during Wilson’s 
presidency, “[f]ederal segregation was being enacted 
to keep Negroes and whites apart” while “other steps 
were taken to appoint Negroes only to menial posts or 
to restrict them from obtaining Civil Service jobs”).   
Given this state of affairs, it is at least debatable 
whether elected representatives would have been as 
concerned about subjecting the Virgin Island’s 
predominantly black population to the judicial 
oversight of jurisdictions in the Deep South as Judge 
Higginbotham’s theory assumed. Moreover, as Judge 
Higginbotham conceded, there is little authority or 




Possessions of the United States.22  He testified about a 
congressional commission that had made suggestions for the 
structure of the government in the Virgin Islands.  
Specifically, Berle informed the Senate Committee that 
“[t]he commission . . . believes[] that in the revision of the 
judicial system of the islands[,] special attention should be 
given to the establishment of a court of appellate jurisdiction 
more accessible than the present tribunal (United States 
[C]ircuit [C]ourt, [T]hird [Circuit], Philadelphia, Pa.).”23  
 Yet as we have explained, there was really no realistic 
alternative to the Third Circuit and certainly no closer, more 
practical alternative at the time.  The First and Second 
Circuits were even farther away than the Third and, for the 
reasons we have explained, the Fifth Circuit, though closer, 
was simply not a practical choice.24   
 Although the United States acquired the Virgin Islands 
in 1917, Congress neglected to organize any civilian 
government there until 1936, when it enacted the Virgin 
Islands Organic Act.25  That Act established a legislative 
body in the Virgin Islands along with municipal councils in 
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas and in Christiansted, St. Croix 
(which had been the Danish Capital).26 
                                                 
 
22 1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 3 
(statement of A. A. Berle, Jr.). 
23 Id. (parenthetical in original). 
24 See Jarvis, supra note 6, at 167 n.38 (discussing 
geographic impracticalities of placing jurisdiction within 
other circuits). 
25 Id. at 161; see Organic Act of the Virgin Islands of 
the United States (Virgin Islands Permanent Government 
Act), Pub. L. No. 74-749, ch. 699, 49 Stat. 1807 (1936) 
(codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1405 et seq.).  
26 Jarvis, supra note 6, at 161; Organic Act of the 
Virgin Islands, ch. 699, § 2, 49 Stat. at 1807.  Congress had 
initially established only a temporary government on the 
Virgin Islands consisting of “a governor appointed by the 
President . . . with the consent of the Senate, [and providing 
that the governor] might be an Army or Navy officer.  As a 




However, most of the more intricate details of Virgin 
Islands governance were not resolved until Congress passed a 
Revised Organic Act in 1954.27  That Act “laid the groundwork 
for the current Virgin Islands court system,” including its “trial 
courts and an appellate court.”28  In particular, it established 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands as an Article IV court29  
with “jurisdiction over federal questions, regardless of the 
amount in controversy, and general original jurisdiction over 
questions of local law, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of 
                                                 
 
officer, but he was not technically responsible to the Navy . . . 
nor was he technically responsible to any department of the 
Government.”  1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 3-4 
(statement of A. A. Berle, Jr.). 
27 Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands, Pub. L. 
No. 83-517, ch. 558, 68 Stat. 497 (1954) (codified as 
amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.). 
28 Defoe v. Phillip, 702 F.3d 735, 738 (3d Cir. 2012); 
see Revised Organic Act, ch. 558, §§ 21-26, 68 Stat. at 506-
07.  A. A. Berle described the difficulties with the Virgin 
Islands judicial system, as initially constructed following 
acquisition from Denmark, in his testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions in 1924:  
 
[T]he system is archaic; it is an old Danish 
system, which even the Danes were about to 
revise, and one of the particular difficulties of 
which the islands bitterly complain lies in the 
fact that a man is judged by a police officer, 
who corresponds roughly with our district 
attorney; and when he comes up for final trial, 
this same judge-district attorney prosecutes him. 
 
1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 6 (statement of A. A. 
Berle, Jr.).   
29 Article IV, Section 3 of the United States 
Constitution states, in relevant part: “Congress shall have 
Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and 
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property 




the local courts over civil actions where the amount in 
controversy was less than $500”30 and over criminal actions 
where the maximum punishment was a fine of $100, 
imprisonment for six months, or both.31  Finally, the Revised 
Organic Act established the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
as an appellate court charged with reviewing the judgments and 
orders of the local Virgin Islands courts.32   
Pursuant to a series of amendments to the Revised 
Organic Act in 1984 (the “1984 Amendments”), the appellate 
role of the District Court expanded.  One such amendment 
created an Appellate Division of the Virgin Islands District 
Court, which would appoint three-judge panels to hear appeals 
                                                 
 
30 Moravian Sch. Advisory Bd. of St. Thomas, V.I. v. 
Rawlins, 70 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 1995); see Revised 
Organic Act, ch. 558, §§ 22-23, 68 Stat. at 506. 
31 Revised Organic Act, ch. 558, §§ 22-23, 68 Stat. at 
506.  Under the Revised Organic Act, the local Virgin Islands 
courts also maintained exclusive original jurisdiction over “all 
violations of police and executive regulations.”  Id. at ch. 558, 
§ 23. 
32 Id. at ch. 558, § 22.  As originally constituted, judges 
of the District Court of the Virgin Islands were appointed by 
the governor, who retained the right to remove them, and 
apparently did so at will.  1924 Senate Hearings, supra note 
19, at 6 (statement of A. A. Berle, Jr., Counsel for the Virgin 
Islands Committee).  See United States v. Malmin, 272 F. 785, 
792 (3d Cir. 1921), wherein this Court granted a writ of 
mandamus to restore the position of Judge Lucius J. M. 
Malmin, a district court judge in the Virgin Islands who had 
been removed by the governor.  The governor had appointed 
the judge pursuant to a provision of the Colonial Code of the 
Municipality of St. Croix.  Id. at 787-88.  However, the 
provision granting the governor that power was set aside in 
1920 by President Woodrow Wilson.  Id. at 788.  Shortly 
following that repeal, the governor nevertheless removed 
Judge Malmin from the bench and appointed a successor.  Id.  
We issued a writ ordering Judge Malmin’s reinstatement to the 
bench and removing the judge whom the governor had 




from local courts.33  Final decisions of the Appellate Division 
could then be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit as a matter of right.34  
The 1984 Amendments also provided a mechanism that 
allowed the Virgin Islands legislature to substantially alter this 
basic framework.  The Amendments granted that legislature 
power to “divest the District Court of original jurisdiction for 
local matters by vesting that jurisdiction in territorial courts 
established by local law for all causes for which ‘any court 
established by the Constitution and laws of the United States 
does not have exclusive jurisdiction.’”35  The 1984 
Amendments thus laid the groundwork for a “dual system of 
local and federal judicial review in the Virgin Islands,” 
                                                 
 
33 See Act of Oct. 5, 1984, Pub. L. No.  98-454, title 
VII, § 705, 98 Stat. 1732, 1739 [hereinafter 1984 Amendment 
to Revised Organic Act] (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a)) 
(“Prior to the establishment of [local Virgin Islands] appellate 
court[s] . . . , the District Court of the Virgin Islands shall 
have such appellate jurisdiction over the courts of the Virgin 
Islands established by local law to the extent now or hereafter 
prescribed by local law . . . .”); id. (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 
1613a(b)) (“Appeals to the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands shall be heard and determined by an appellate division 
of the court consisting of three judges, of whom two shall 
constitute a quorum.”). 
34 Id. at title VII, § 705, 98 Stat. at 1740 (codified at 48 
U.S.C. § 1613a(c)) (“The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all 
final decisions of the district court on appeal from the courts 
established by local law.”). 
35 Parrott v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 230 F.3d 615, 
619 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1611(b)); see 1984 
Amendment to Revised Organic Act, title VII, § 702, 98 Stat. 
at 1737 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1984)) (“The 
legislature of the Virgin Islands may vest in the courts of the 
Virgin Islands established by local law jurisdiction over all 
causes in the Virgin Islands over which any court established 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States does not 




whereby the Virgin Islands courts could expand their original 
jurisdiction over both criminal and civil matters.36  By 1991, 
the Virgin Islands had “exercised that power, vesting exclusive 
jurisdiction over local [civil] actions in the Territorial Court of 
the Virgin Islands—now known as the Superior Court of the 
Virgin Islands.”37  Thereafter, “the District Court continued to 
hear appeals from local trial courts, and it retained concurrent 
jurisdiction over local crimes that are similar to federal 
crimes.”38  
 This concurrent jurisdiction ended in 1994 when the 
Virgin Islands legislature vested exclusive jurisdiction over all 
local crimes with the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands.39  
That court thus became the initial, exclusive arbiter of both 
local criminal and civil actions. 
The District Court of the Virgin Islands continued to 
serve an appellate function until 2004, when the Virgin Islands 
legislature exercised the authority Congress had given it in the 
Revised Organic Act to establish the Supreme Court of the 
                                                 
 
36 Parrott, 230 F.3d at 619. 
37 Defoe, 702 F.3d at 738; see Act of Sept. 5, 1990, No. 
5594, § 1, 1990 V.I. Sess. Laws 271 (codified as amended at 
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 76(a)) (granting the Superior Court of 
the Virgin Islands “original jurisdiction in all civil actions 
regardless of the amount in controversy” and thus divesting 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands original jurisdiction 
over purely local civil matters); 1984 Amendment to Revised 
Organic Act, title VII, § 703, 98 Stat. at 1738 (“[T]he District 
Court of the Virgin Islands shall have general original 
jurisdiction in all causes in the Virgin Islands the jurisdiction 
over which is not then vested by local law in the local courts 
of the Virgin Islands . . . .”).   
38 Defoe, 702 F.3d at 738.  
39 Act of Sept. 30, 1993, No. 5890, § 1, 1993 V.I. Sess. 
Laws 214 (codified as amended at  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 
76(b)); see 1984 Amendment to Revised Organic Act, title 
VII, § 702, 98 Stat. at 1737 (codified at 48 U.S.C. § 1611(b) 




Virgin Islands.40  The creation of that court “altered the 
relationship between the federal judiciary and the Virgin 
Islands court system.”41  In addition to ending the federal 
district court’s appellate jurisdiction over local decisions,42 the 
establishment of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands gave 
rise to our certiorari jurisdiction over final decisions of that 
court pursuant to the 1984 Amendments to the Revised 
Organic Act, as codified in 48 U.S.C. § 1613.43  It also 
provided for a mechanism for the termination of that certiorari 
jurisdiction.  We explained this in Pichardo v. Virgin Islands 
Commissioner of Labor: 
[U]nder the terms of the Revised Organic Act, 
for the first fifteen years after the establishment 
of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, [the Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit] “shall have 
jurisdiction to review by writ of certiorari all 
final decisions of the highest court of the Virgin 
Islands from which a decision could be had.”44  
[The Act] also requires our Court to submit 
reports to Congress regarding whether the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands has 
“developed sufficient institutional traditions to 
                                                 
 
40 See Act of Oct. 29, 2004, No. 6687, § 1, 2004 V.I. 
Sess. Laws 179 (codified as amended at V.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, 
§ 2(a)) (designating the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
as the “court of last resort” pursuant to the power Congress 
granted the Virgin Islands legislature under section 21(b) of 
the Revised Organic Act).  
41 Defoe, 702 F.3d at 739. 
42 See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(a) (setting forth that the 
District Court’s appellate jurisdiction ends once the Virgin 
Islands legislature creates its own appellate court). 
43 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994), amended by 48 U.S.C. § 
1613 (2012); 1984 Amendment to the Revised Organic Act, 
title VII, § 704, 98 Stat. at 1739.   




justify direct review by the Supreme Court of the 
United States from all such final decisions.”45  
Thus, Congress included an interim reporting obligation 
in recognition of the possibility that the new Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands “might develop sufficient institutional 
traditions [to replace our certiorari review with certiorari 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court] before the fifteen-year 
mark.”46   
The rate of maturation and sophistication of the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands is noted in our 2012 
opinion in Banks v. International Rental & Leasing Corp. 
(which predated H.R. 6116).47  There, we certified a 
controlling question of Virgin Islands law to the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands pursuant to rules that court had 
adopted to advise us on questions of local law when 
appropriate.48  We did so because “the United States Supreme 
Court has encouraged federal appellate courts to seek guidance 
from the highest court of the appropriate jurisdiction if that 
court has adopted procedures for accepting certified questions 
of law.”49  In relying on the resulting opinion of the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands to resolve the issue before us, we 
                                                 
 
45 Pichardo v. Virgin Islands Comm’r of Labor, 613 
F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994 
version)). 
46 Kendall v. Daily News Pub. Co., 716 F.3d 82, 86 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (Kendall I); see Defoe, 702 F.3d at 739-40 
(discussing 2012 interim report). 
47 680 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2012).   
48 Id. at 298-99; see V.I. Sup. Ct. R. 38(a) (“The 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands may answer questions of 
law certified to it by a court of the United States . . . if there is 
involved in any proceeding before the certifying court a 
question of law which may be determinative of the cause then 
pending in the certifying court and concerning which it 
appears there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of 
the Supreme Court.”). 




commented that the opinion was “commendably thorough and 
very well reasoned.”50  
2. Repeal of the Third Circuit’s Certiorari Jurisdiction 
Pursuant to our obligation to periodically assess its 
development and maturation, our prior Chief Judge appointed 
a committee to undertake an in-depth inquiry into  the progress 
and jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.51  
In 2012, that committee issued a glowing assessment.  It 
unanimously concluded that the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands had demonstrated “sufficient institutional traditions to 
justify direct review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States.”52  Accordingly, the committee recommended that 
Congress eliminate our certiorari jurisdiction in favor of direct 
review by the U.S. Supreme Court.53   
Congress quickly acted upon our recommendation.  
That same year, it passed H.R. 6116, which (as we noted at the 
outset) replaced our certiorari jurisdiction with direct U.S. 
Supreme Court certiorari review of “cases commenced on or 
after” the statute’s effective date of December 28, 2012.54  
More specifically, in section 3 of H.R. 6116, Congress 
specified an “EFFECTIVE DATE” for the repeal of our 
jurisdiction as follows: “The amendments made by this Act 
                                                 
 
50 Id. at 299. 
51 Letter from D. Brooks Smith, Circuit Judge, Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals, to Theodore A. McKee, Chief 
Circuit Judge 1 (April 18, 2012), 
http://www.visupremecourt.org/wfData/files/BookletReportof
VirginIslandsSupremeCourt.pdf. 
52 Judicial Council of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit, Report on the Virgin Islands Supreme Court 




53 Id. at 17, 23.  Indeed, we later noted that the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands “passed that test with 
flying colors.” Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 86. 




apply to cases commenced on or after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.”55  
Thus, as we have already explained, we must now 
decide if “cases commenced on or after the date of the 
enactment” refers to all cases filed in the Virgin Islands courts 
on or after the enactment of H.R. 6116 (as we held in Bason) 
or only to appeals from final decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the Virgin Islands that were commenced on or after that date.   
II. DISCUSSION 
“The doctrine of stare decisis is . . . ‘essential to the 
respect accorded to the judgments of . . . [c]ourt[s] and to the 
stability of the law.’”56  Thus, we do not lightly revisit an issue 
that a panel of this Court has already decided in a precedential 
opinion.  Nevertheless, Federal Appellate Procedure Rule 35 
appropriately allows courts of appeals to grant en banc 
(re)hearing to reconsider prior precedential decisions when a 
case “involves a question of exceptional importance.”57  
Thus, stare decisis “does not compel us to follow a past 
decision when its rationale no longer withstands ‘careful 
analysis.’”58  “If [our] precedent’s reasoning was clearly 
wrong, then stare decisis loses some (though not all) of its 
force.”59  Indeed, en banc review serves a very important 
institutional purpose for just that reason.  It provides a vehicle 
by which we can revisit prior decisions when appropriate. 
Here, we have decided not only to revisit an issue we 
have already resolved in a precedential decision, but also to 
grant an initial en banc hearing on that issue without awaiting 
a panel decision.  
Initial en banc hearing is extraordinary; it 
is ordered only when a majority of the active 
judges who are not disqualified, determines that 
                                                 
 
55 Id. at § 3, 126 Stat. at 1607.   
56 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) (quoting 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)).  
57 Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2). 
58 Gant, 556 U.S. at 348 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. 
at 577). 
59 Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 180 (3d Cir. 2013) 




the case is controlled by a prior decision of the 
court which should be reconsidered and the case 
is of such immediate importance that exigent 
circumstances require initial consideration by the 
full court.60  
We have concluded that this case presents such a question and 
that exigent circumstances warranted initial en banc review.   
 Given the important role this Court has played in the 
evolution of the judicial system of the Virgin Islands, the very 
important institutional issues implicated by the revocation of 
our certiorari jurisdiction, and the impact our decision will 
have on thousands of pending cases in the courts of the Virgin 
Islands, we believe that exigent circumstances justified initial 
en banc review here.  
As we have noted, we first decided the issue we revisit 
today in Bason, a decision we issued shortly after H.R. 6116 
became law.  The “threshold question[]” there was “whether 
[the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit] retain[s] certiorari 
jurisdiction over proceedings that were filed in the Virgin 
Islands courts before the date of enactment of H.R. 6116.”61  
More precisely, we defined the issue as “whether ‘cases 
commenced’ carries a broader meaning referring to the filing 
of a complaint in the Superior Court or a narrower meaning 
referring to the filing of a certiorari petition in this Court.”62   
We concluded that “cases commenced,” as used in H.R. 
6116, encompassed initial “proceedings filed in the Virgin 
Islands courts,” e.g., complaints filed in the Superior Court of 
the Virgin Islands.63  Our conclusion rested on the traditional 
understanding that a case is “commenced when it is first 
brought in an appropriate court.”64  We reasoned that had 
Congress “indeed meant to strip this Court of certiorari 
                                                 
 
60 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.2 (2018) (emphasis added). 
61 Bason, 767 F.3d at 201. 
62 Id. at 205-06 (quoting Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87). 
63 Id. at 206.   
64 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 





jurisdiction over proceedings already filed in the Virgin Islands 
courts before the enactment date of the legislation,” it would 
have used clearer language to do so, just as it did when it 
divested the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit of its 
jurisdiction over final decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico.65   
Shortly after Bason, we briefly addressed the same 
jurisdictional question in Fahie v. Virgin Islands.66  Like 
Bason, Fahie came to us on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands.67  In addition to the briefing 
provided by the parties there, the Virgin Islands Bar 
Association filed an amicus brief “challenging our jurisdiction 
to consider th[e] matter at all.”68  The jurisdictional issue 
identified in Fahie was identical to the one that is now before 
this en banc Court: 
The operative question [was] whether [H.R. 
6116] revokes jurisdiction over cases 
commenced in the Superior Court on or after 
December 28, 2012, or whether the law only 
revokes jurisdiction over cases that have 
commenced in our Court (through a petition for 
writ of certiorari) on or after that date.69 
That question was key because “the case against Fahie 
commenced in the Superior Court in November 2011, but was 
                                                 
 
65 Id. at 206-07; see Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 
87-189, § 3, 75 Stat. 417 (1961) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1258) (specifying that the repeal of jurisdiction of the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals over cases from the Supreme Court 
of Puerto Rico “shall not deprive the Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit of jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals 
taken to that court . . . before the effective date of this Act”); 
see also discussion infra, Part II.B.2. 
66 858 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2017). 
67 Id. at 164. 
68 Id. 




not the subject of a petition [for certiorari] to us until 2016,” 
four years after H.R. 6116 became law.70   
As in Bason, we began our jurisdictional analysis in 
Fahie by noting that the Revised Organic Act had given us, 
“for a limited time, certiorari jurisdiction over all final 
decisions of the highest court of the Virgin Islands from which 
a decision could be had.”71  But we explained that Bason had 
already decided that “cases commenced” referred to “all cases 
commenced in the Superior Court [on or] after December 28, 
2012.”72  In a footnote that foreshadowed this appeal, we added 
that “[e]ven if we were to agree that Bason was wrongly 
decided, we are not at liberty to overturn the holding without 
en banc review because it is not dicta.”73   
A.  The Meaning of “Cases Commenced” 
H.R. 6116 did not define “cases commenced.”  Bason 
therefore focused on the need to construe undefined terms in a 
                                                 
 
70 Id. at 168.  
71 Id. at 167 (citing 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994 version)); 
see 1984 Amendment to Revised Organic Act, title VII, § 704, 
98 Stat. at 1739. 
72 Fahie, 858 F.3d at 168. 
73 Id. at 168 n.8.  In Hodge v. Bluebeard’s Castle, Inc., 
62 V.I. 671 (V.I. 2015), a 2015 opinion written by Justice 
Maria M. Cabret, the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
suggested similar reservations about the result we reached in 
Bason. There, the court observed:  
 
President Barack Obama signed H.R. 6116 into 
law, ending the Third Circuit’s certiorari 
jurisdiction 10 years early.  Despite this, the 
Third Circuit recently held that the effective 
date of this legislation . . . referenced the date a 
case was commenced by filing a complaint in 
the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, as 
opposed to the date a case is commenced in the 
Third Circuit seeking a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.  
 




statute “in accordance with [their] ordinary or natural 
meaning.”74  In doing so, we first pointed to precedent from the 
U.S. Supreme Court and several of our sister circuit courts of 
appeals and observed that “[t]he term ‘case’ has generally been 
understood to include judicial proceedings of any kind.”75  We 
then equated “cause” with “case,” noting that they “are 
constantly used as synonyms in statutes . . . , each meaning a 
proceeding in court, a suit, or action.”76  Accordingly, we 
deduced that “cases commenced” in H.R. 6116 referred to 
“case[s] or cause[s] of action . . . ‘when [they are] first brought 
in an appropriate court.’”77    
In conducting our analysis, we acknowledged the 
Virgin Islands government’s argument that, based on U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent as well as “the alleged purpose” of 
H.R. 6116, the phrase “cases commenced” should be defined 
as the filing of a certiorari petition.78  However, we dismissed 
that argument without much discussion.79  Yet as the U.S. 
Supreme Court has instructed, “[i]t is contrary to the spirit of 
                                                 
 
74 United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 
2014) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994)), 
cited with approval by Bason, 767 F.3d at 206. 
75 Bason, 767 F.3d at 206 (emphasis added). 
76 Id. (quoting Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 
241 (1998)) (ellipsis in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
77 Id. (citing Pritchett, 420 F.3d at 1094); see also, e.g., 
Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“In California, as in the federal courts, a suit is ‘commenced’ 
upon filing.”). 
78 Bason, 767 F.3d at 206. 
79 See id. at 209 (declining to find the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000), 
controlling because Slack “did not discuss whether there may 
be a meaningful difference between . . . an open-ended and 
unmodified provision [like H.R. 6116] and a provision that 
refers, for instance, to ‘appellate cases commenced’”); id. at 
209 (distinguishing Slack because, unlike H.R. 6116, the 
habeas provisions at issue there “did not divest one court of 





the . . . law itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason 
to a case where that reason utterly fails.”80  Our reliance on the 
generally accepted meaning of “cases” rather than focusing on 
the reason the legislation was enacted or the specific context in 
which the word was used in H.R. 6116, resulted in our adopting 
a definition that was not sufficiently tethered to, or informed 
by, congressional purpose.   
 We now conclude that the decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Slack v. McDaniel should have more sharply focused 
and guided our inquiry in Bason.  In Slack, the Court had to 
decide whether a provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)81 amending 28 U.S.C. § 
2253, a habeas corpus statute, applied to a request for a 
“Certificate of Appeal” (COA) from a district court’s denial of 
a habeas petition.82  The Court noted that it had already held in 
1997 in Lindh v. Murphy83 that “AEDPA’s amendments to 28 
U.S.C. § 2254, the statute governing entitlement to habeas 
relief in the district court, applied to cases filed after AEDPA’s 
effective date.”84  Slack argued that the relevant AEDPA 
provision did not apply to him because his habeas petition had 
been “commenced in the [d]istrict [c]ourt pre-AEDPA,” i.e., 
before AEDPA imposed new requirements for habeas 
petitions.85  The Court disagreed.  It held that AEDPA did 
apply because Slack had filed his COA request after AEDPA 
was enacted.86  The analysis turned on the fact that the 
provision Slack’s argument relied upon pertained to 
“proceedings in the district courts while [28 U.S.C. § 2253, the 
                                                 
 
80 Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) 
(quoting Reno Smelting Works v. Stevenson, 21 P. 317, 320 
(Nev. 1889), abrogated on other grounds by Williams v. 
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). 
81 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1994 ed., Supp. III). 
82 Slack, 529 U.S. at 481. 
83 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 
84 Slack, 529 U.S. at 481 (citing Lindh, 521 U.S. at 
327). 
85 Id.  




controlling provision, was] directed to proceedings in the 
appellate courts.”87  
Slack thus informs our resolution of the meaning of 
“cases commenced” in H.R. 6116.  As the Court there 
explained, “[w]hen Congress instructs . . . that application of a 
statute is triggered by the commencement of a case, the 
relevant case for a statute directed to appeals is the one initiated 
in the appellate court.”88  The Court further explained that 
“[w]hile an appeal is a continuation of the litigation started in 
the trial court, it is a distinct step.  We have described 
proceedings in the courts of appeals as ‘appellate cases.’  
Under AEDPA, an appellate case is commenced when the 
application for a COA is filed.”89   
Similarly, H.R. 6116 was enacted to address certiorari 
review of decisions of the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands. 90  The interpretation of “cases commenced” in H.R. 
6116 must therefore focus on appellate cases—cases on 
certiorari review.  Our analysis in Bason was unduly 
influenced by reliance on trial-level cases and trial-level 
process.91  The resulting conclusion was insufficiently 
                                                 
 
87 Id. at 481. 
88 Id. at 482. 
89 Id. at 481-82 (citations omitted). 
90 Cf. Bason, 767 F.3d at 209 (“[B]ecause [H.R. 6116] 
is supposedly directed to proceedings in the Third Circuit, it 
would purportedly then apply to proceedings initiated in the 
Third Circuit after H.R. 6116’s date of enactment.”).   
91 See id. at 207.  This portion of Bason cited, for 
example, the provision vesting federal district courts with 
supplementary jurisdiction in the Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, title III, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5114 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367) (“The amendments made 
by this section shall apply to civil actions commenced on or 
after the date of the enactment of this Act.” (emphasis 
added)); the removal jurisdiction provision of the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-336, § 3(b), 100 
Stat. 633, 637 (1986) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 
1441) (“The amendment made by this section shall apply with 




informed by the legislative purpose of H.R. 6116 and thus 
inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis in Slack.92    
B. Similar Jurisdictional Repeals 
Interpreting “cases commenced” in H.R. 6116 as the 
filing of a petition for certiorari review, as opposed to the filing 
of a complaint, is consistent with Congress’s termination of the 
certiorari jurisdiction other circuit courts of appeals 
temporarily had over the supreme courts of other U.S. 
territories.  
1. Guam 
Congress gave the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit temporary jurisdiction over appeals from the Supreme 
Court of Guam in 1984.93  The relevant statute provided:  
[F]or the first fifteen years following the 
establishment of the [Supreme Court of Guam], 
                                                 
 
on or after the date of the enactment of this section.” 
(emphasis added)); and the provision governing the district 
courts’ removal jurisdiction and interlocutory appeals in class 
action proceedings in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 9, 119 Stat. 4, 14 (codified as amended 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1332) (“The amendments made by this Act 
shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the date 
of enactment of this Act.” (emphasis added)).  Bason, 767 
F.3d at 207. 
92 We emphasize that our analysis here is not intended 
to necessarily provide guidance on statutes other than H.R. 
6116. This includes, but is not limited to, those analogous 
provisions in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 34 U.S.C.; the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; the Third Circuit 
Local Rules; the Third Circuit Internal Operating 
Procedures; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 
district-level statutes, such as those embodied in the Class 
Action Fairness Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1453 and 
1711-1715. 
93 Act of Oct. 5, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-454, title VIII, § 





the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by writ 
of certiorari all final decisions of the highest 
court of Guam from which a decision could be 
had. The Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit 
shall submit reports to the Committee on Energy 
and Natural Resources of the Senate and the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the 
House of Representatives at intervals of five 
years following the establishment of such 
appellate court as to whether it has developed 
sufficient institutional traditions to justify direct 
review by the Supreme Court of the United 
States from all such final decisions.94 
Thus, like our own jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands, certiorari jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit over the Supreme Court of Guam was 
meant to sunset after fifteen years or until the judicial council 
of that circuit determined that Guam had “developed sufficient 
institutional traditions to justify direct review by the [U.S.] 
Supreme Court.”95  
Yet in 2004, before the expiration of fifteen years, 
Congress amended the law to revoke the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, just as it revoked our 
certiorari jurisdiction in H.R. 6116.96  However, in contrast to 
H.R. 6116, in the case of Guam, Congress failed to provide an 
effective date for the legislation rescinding certiorari 
jurisdiction. The amendment simply struck language that had 
authorized the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
exercise certiorari review over final decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Guam:  




96 See Act of Oct. 30, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-378, § 2, 
118 Stat. 2206, 2208 (current version at 48 U.S.C. § 1424-2) 
(striking language in § 1424-2 regarding certiorari jurisdiction 




Section 22B of the Organic Act of Guam 
(48 U.S.C. 1424–2) is amended by striking 
“: Provided, That [for the first fifteen years 
following the establishment of the appellate 
court authorized by section 22A(a) of this Act, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit shall have jurisdiction to review by writ 
of certiorari all final decisions of the highest 
court of Guam from which a decision could be 
had. . . .97]” and all that follows through the end 
and inserting a period. 98 
 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had to 
interpret the scope of that repeal just two years later in Santos 
v. Guam.99  There, a certiorari petition had been filed, 
calendared, and argued in the Ninth Circuit prior to the 
repeal.100  The court therefore had to determine “whether the 
jurisdiction previously granted [to the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit], and existing at the time certiorari was granted, 
. . . evaporated upon the enactment date of the repeal, or . . . 
continued to exist until the pending appeal could be 
decided.”101   
As the Court of Appeals explained, “Congress [had] 
amended the distribution of appellate jurisdiction in the 
Territory of Guam without expressing an intent as to the 
effective date of its new statute.”102  In resolving the issue, the 
court looked to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1952 ruling in 
Bruner v. United States.103  The court read that case to explain 
that “when a jurisdictional statute under which an action had 
been properly filed was repealed, without any reservation as to 
                                                 
 
97 Act of Oct. 5, 1984, title VIII, § 801, 98 Stat. at 
1742. 
98 Act of Oct. 30, 2004, § 2, 118 Stat. at 2208. 
99 436 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). 
100 Id. at 1052. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 1053. 




pending cases, all such pending cases were to be dismissed.”104  
Because there was “no principled distinction between Bruner’s 
jurisdiction-withdrawing statute” and the one revoking 
certiorari authority over appeals from the Supreme Court of 
Guam, the court reasoned that Congress must have intended 
the revocation of jurisdiction to apply to all cases as soon as it 
became law.105  Accordingly, the court concluded “Congress 
had taken away [its] power to hear” and “to decide the case.”106 
Thus, to the extent it is relevant to our inquiry, Santos counsels 
in favor of broadly interpreting jurisdictional repeals that do 
not contain a savings clause. 
This case, is of course, different because Congress did 
specify the date that H.R. 6116 was to become effective: 
December 28, 2012.107 Defendants thus argue that “Congress 
uses specific language to exempt cases already filed in the 
appellate court divested of jurisdiction.”108  They suggest that 
since the appeals process for this case began in the Virgin 
Islands courts before H.R. 6116 became effective, and since 
Congress did not specifically exclude appeals pending on its 
effective date, the repeal occasioned by H.R. 6116 does not 
apply here.  However, that argument fails to address the 
meaning of “cases commenced” in H.R. 6116.  Thus, to accept 
it, we would have to ignore the teachings of Slack and thereby 
judicially amend H.R. 6116 by reading “cases commenced on 
or after December 28, 2012” out of the statute.  We decline to 
do so. 
2. Puerto Rico 
We are similarly unpersuaded by attempts to analogize 
H.R. 6116 to the revocation of certiorari jurisdiction that the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had over final decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.   
Congress gave the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
temporary certiorari jurisdiction over appeals from the 
                                                 
 
104 Santos, 436 F.3d. at 1052 (citing Bruner, 343 U.S. 
at 115-17). 
105 Id. at 1053. 
106 Id. 
107 H.R. 6116, § 3, 126 Stat. at 1607. 




Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in 1948.109  Unlike the Revised 
Organic Act provision pertaining to decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands or the statute giving the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction over decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Guam, the law vesting the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit with jurisdiction over the Supreme Court 
of Puerto Rico contained no sunset provision.  Rather, it stated, 
in relevant part: 
The court[] of appeals for the First . . . Circuit[] 
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final 
decisions of the supreme court[] of Puerto Rico . 
. . in all cases involving the Constitution, laws or 
treaties of the United States or any authority 
exercised thereunder, in all habeas corpus 
proceedings, and in all other civil cases where 
the value in controversy exceeds $5,000, 
exclusive of interest and costs. 110 
Nevertheless, Congress enacted legislation in 1961 that 
repealed that certiorari jurisdiction.  That legislation simply 
stated:  
Section 1293 of title 28, United States Code, is repealed: 
Provided, That such repeal shall not deprive the Court 
of Appeals 
for the First Circuit of jurisdiction to hear and determine 
appeals 
taken to that court from the Supreme Court of Puerto 
Rico before 
the effective date of this Act.111   
Thus, Congress expressly included a savings clause preserving 
certiorari authority “over appeals taken to that Court from the 
                                                 
 
109 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1293, 62 Stat. 929, 
929 (previously codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1293) (repealed 
1961). 
110 Id.  
111 Act of Aug. 30, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-189, § 3, 75 





Supreme Court of Puerto Rico before the effective date of [the] 
Act.”112  
 In Bason, we focused on that distinction. We explained:  
When Congress stripped the [Court of Appeals 
for the] First Circuit of its jurisdiction over the 
Puerto Rico Supreme Court, it expressly stated 
that “such repeal shall not deprive the Court of 
Appeals of jurisdiction to hear and determine 
appeals taken to that court from the Supreme 
Court of Puerto Rico before the effective date of 
this Act.”113  
. . . . 
In H.R. 6116, Congress took a different 
approach . . . .  Instead of enacting an exception 
reserving our jurisdiction over “pending 
appeals” (or even “pending cases”), Congress 
chose to make it clear that it is the jurisdiction-
stripping (and jurisdiction-conferring) 
legislation itself that only applies to “cases 
commenced” on or after the enactment date.114 
Thus, Defendants now understandably argue that 
Congress’s failure to similarly limit H.R. 6116 to “appeals” 
commenced on or after the effective date must mean that 
Congress did not intend any such limitation.  In other words, 
Defendants argue that Congress must have meant “cases” in 
the generally understood sense.  That definition would 
presumptively include any litigation (i.e., “case”) commenced 
by filing a complaint in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 
after December 28, 2012, the date H.R. 6116 became effective.  
However, as we have already explained, that argument ignores 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s guidance regarding how we should 
interpret “cases” in a statute applying only to appeals.  As the 
Court explained in Slack, an appeal is its own “case” for 
purposes of such statutes. 115  Therefore we will no longer 
                                                 
 
112 Id. (emphasis added).  
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114 Bason, 767 F.3d at 206-07. 




assume Congress used “cases” in H.R. 6116 as that word is 
generally understood.116  Moreover, aside from Bason, no 
federal appellate court has interpreted the effective date of a 
certiorari-stripping statute as an implicit jurisdictional 
reservation of appellate jurisdiction over cases at the trial level, 
absent specific language to that effect.  
C. Practical Effects 
Moreover, although we cited in Bason our Court’s 
statement in a previous case that we should not “blindly” 
construe undefined statutory terms, we did not heed that 
admonition.117  We did not consider whether “the whole 
legislation, . . . the circumstances surrounding [H.R. 6116’s] 
enactment, or . . . the absurd results which follow from giving 
such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to 
believe that the legislator intended to include the particular 
act.”118  We realize, of course, that our interpretation of a 
statute should not unduly focus on its impact on pending 
litigation.  However, the practical consequences of a given 
interpretation can help inform an inquiry into congressional 
intent.  As the U.S. Supreme Court instructed in Griffin v. 
Oceanic Contractors, Inc., “interpretations of a statute which 
would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative 
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are 
available.”119  It is therefore appropriate to consider “the 
                                                 
 
116 See id. at 481 (“While an appeal is a continuation of 
the litigation started in the trial court, it is a distinct step.”).   
117 Bason, 767 F.3d at 206 (citing Brown, 740 F.3d at 
149).  
118 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 
459 (1892). 
119 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); see also Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965) (“[I]n 
interpreting a statute, [a court has] ‘some scope for adopting a 
restricted rather than a literal or usual meaning of its words 
where acceptance of that meaning would lead to absurd 
results . . . or would thwart the obvious purpose of the 
statute.’  But it is otherwise ‘where no such consequences 
[would] follow and where . . . it appears to be consonant with 




specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole,” if we are to “avoid 
constructions that produce ‘odd’ or ‘absurd results’ or that are 
‘inconsistent with common sense.’”120   
H.R. 6116 was enacted for the sole purpose of 
rescinding our certiorari jurisdiction over appeals from the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands.  As noted earlier, the 
Revised Organic Act established a maximum period of fifteen 
years for us to exercise certiorari review.121  That window was 
created to allow the new Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
                                                 
 
(citations omitted) (quoting Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 
504, 510-11 (1941)); In re Magic Restaurants, Inc., 205 F.3d 
108, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Even where the express language of 
a statute appears unambiguous, a court must look beyond that 
plain language where a literal interpretation of this language 
would thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme, 
would lead to an absurd result, or would otherwise produce a 
result ‘demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the 
drafters.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Demarest v. 
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)); United States v.  
Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 880 (3d Cir.1994) (“It is the 
obligation of the court to construe a statute to avoid absurd 
results, if alternative interpretations are available and 
consistent with the legislative purpose.”). 
120 Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 
539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 (3d Cir. 
2004)); see also Long v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 671 
F.3d 371, 374-75 (3d Cir. 2012) (“In analyzing whether the 
statutory language is unambiguous, ‘we take account of the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.’” (quoting Disabled 
in Action of Pa., 539 F.39 at 210)). 
121 See 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994 version); see also 158 
Cong. Rec. H6354 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2012) (statement of 
Rep. Bobby Scott) (“The Revised Organic Act specifically 
grants the [T]hird [C]ircuit appellate jurisdiction for the first 





to “develop[] . . . institutional traditions” sufficient to justify 
direct U.S. Supreme Court review.122   
A committee of our Court found that the Supreme Court 
of the Virgin Islands had demonstrated such sufficiency in less 
than fifteen years,123 and within a year of our Judicial Council 
unanimously approving that committee’s report, Congress 
enacted H.R. 6116 in recognition of that finding.  This was a 
momentous occasion in the history of the Virgin Islands 
judicial system. One congresswoman characterized H.R. 6116 
as a “historic milestone” demarcating “the verge of 
accomplishing the final goal of making the U.S. Virgin Islands 
Supreme Court just like all other [s]tate supreme courts.”124  
Perpetuating our certiorari review by extending it to all suits 
initiated in the Virgin Islands judicial system before H.R. 6116 
was enacted is contrary to our recognition of the institutional 
competence of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands and the 
excellence of its jurisprudence.  
Linking the “commence[ment]” of an appeal from the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands to the filing of a complaint 
for purposes of our certiorari authority retains that authority 
beyond the fifteen years Congress originally set for it. The 
Virgin Islands Bar Association has represented without 
contradiction that, as of 2014, there were over 6,000 pending 
cases in the Virgin Islands courts, each taking an average of ten 
years for adjudication.125  There is therefore a mounting 
backlog of cases in the Virgin Islands courts.126   
                                                 
 
122 1984 Amendment to Revised Organic Act, title VII, 
§ 704, 98 Stat. at 1739. 
123 Third Circuit Judicial Council Report, supra note 
51, at 23. 
124 158 Cong. Rec. H6354-55 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2012) 
(statement of Del. Donna Christian-Christensen). 
125 See Fahie, 858 F.3d at 167 n.6.   
126 Amicus Companion Insurance Company urges that 
to the extent there is any “backlog” in the Virgin Islands 
courts, it is an apocryphal one.  Br. of Amicus Curiae 
Companion Ins. Co.  2-3.  Yet it is undeniable, even with the 




This very case illustrates the likelihood that a large 
number of the now-pending cases will not be resolved for years 
to come.  This complaint was filed in 2005, but the claims only 
reached the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands on appeal in 
2015, ten years later.  The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
issued its decision in this case a year later, in 2016, and we 
granted the petition for certiorari in 2017, nearly twelve years 
after the case had originally been filed.  It is therefore highly 
likely that interpreting H.R. 6116 to include all suits filed 
before H.R. 6116’s effective date of December 28, 2012, 
would extend our certiorari review over a significant number 
of cases through at least December 2022.  Not only would this 
be ten years past the effective date of H.R. 6116, but it would 
also be eighteen years after the creation of the Supreme Court 
of the Virgin Islands and a full three years beyond the fifteen-
year period Congress initially set for our certiorari jurisdiction 
to end. Yet, it is beyond dispute that Congress intended H.R. 
6116 to terminate our certiorari review, not prolong it.   
We are, of course, aware of the concern expressed in 
Bason that it would be unjust for us not to retain jurisdiction 
over cases filed in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands 
before the effective date of H.R. 6116 given the parties’ 
expectations before that legislation was enacted.127  However, 
we question the reasonableness of any such expectations.  As 
we have already noted, H.R. 6116 contained no express 
savings clause or other instruction as to non-appellate cases 
commenced before H.R. 6116’s effective date.  Moreover, 
nothing in the Revised Organic Act, the 1984 Amendments 
thereto, or subsequent enactments of the Virgin Islands 
                                                 
 
See id. at 3 (showing increases in the V.I. judiciary caseload 
in 2016 over both 2014 and 2015).   
127 See Bason, 767 F.3d at 210 (“[L]ike litigants who 
filed their certiorari petitions before December 28, 2012, 
parties who were in the midst of litigating a proceeding in the 
Virgin Islands courts could have reasonably expected that 
they would have the right to file a petition for certiorari with 
the Third Circuit and, at the very least, possibly obtain further 
review with respect to questions of Virgin Islands law (which 




legislature gave anyone reason to believe that our certiorari 
jurisdiction would continue until a given appeal is ultimately 
decided.  Rather, our certiorari jurisdiction was always to be of 
relatively short duration.   
Moreover, as we have explained, the Revised Organic 
Act clearly provided for our certiorari jurisdiction to end well 
before the fifteen years Congress initially allowed for its 
exercise.128  Attorneys and litigants therefore had no reason to 
assume that we would continue to have authority to review any 
final order of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands until 
their case was ultimately resolved.  That was particularly true 
after the passage of H.R. 6116.129  In addition, litigants were 
                                                 
 
128 1984 Amendment to Revised Organic Act, title VII, 
§ 704, 98 Stat. at 1739; 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994 version). 
129 Amicus Companion Insurance Company wishes to 
obtain review of an adverse decision by the Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands that is based on Virgin Islands law.  
Companion Ins. Co. Br., at v.  It states that a “key factor” in 
its decision to appeal the case through the Virgin Islands 
courts “was the availability of potential certiorari review by 
this Court if the V.I. Supreme Court’s decision was adverse.”  
Id. at vi.   
Companion’s reliance on our certiorari review was 
misplaced for two reasons.  First, the very passage of H.R. 
6116—having occurred six years ago confirms Congress’s 
conclusion that the Virgin Islands judiciary warrants 
treatment “just like every high court in the States and 
territories,” 158 Cong. Rec. H6354 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2012) 
(statement of Del. Christensen), and state supreme courts are 
the final arbiters of matters of state law.   
Second, we have long held that we defer to the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands in matters of local law 
because that “best ensures that [we] can perform the role 
given to us by Congress[] to nurture the development of 
‘sufficient institutional traditions to justify direct review by 
the Supreme Court of the United States.’”  Pichardo, 613 
F.3d at 97 (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994 version)).  Our 
very infrequent grants of certiorari review have rarely 




forewarned because, even before H.R. 6116 was enacted, 
Congress had amended similar statutory schemes in order to 
divest other federal circuit courts of appeals of jurisdiction to 
review even pending appeals from the local courts of other U.S. 
territories.130, 131   
                                                 
 
overturned or vacated a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands only twice since that court was created.  
Neither of those cases appears to have impacted local 
jurisprudence.  Once was in Bason itself, which we now 
overturn.  Bason, 767 F.3d at 214-16 (vacating the opinion of 
the court to the extent it addressed the moot issue of the 
reinstatement of the deceased petitioner).  The second 
instance occurred in the very limited context of a contained 
local political dispute.  In re Kendall, 712 F.3d 814, 816 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (Kendall II) (reversing the court’s convictions of a 
judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands for indirect 
criminal contempt after he published a judicial opinion 
chastising the court). 
130 See Act of Oct. 30, 2004, § 2, 118 Stat. at 2208 
(transferring certiorari jurisdiction over decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Guam from the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and to the U.S. Supreme Court); Santos, 436 
F.3d at 1053-54 (deciding, pursuant to Act of Oct. 30, 2004, § 
2, 118 Stat. at 2208, that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit had no further jurisdiction to review decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Guam, including those that had been 
pending at the time of enactment). 
131 Our holding is also consistent with our general 
avoidance of retroactivity in interpreting statutes.  Absent 
clear congressional intent to the contrary, we normally 
interpret statutes with the presumption that they do not apply 
retroactively, i.e., to cases pending on the date of the law’s 
enactment.  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006).  
But as we clarified in Kendall I, this presumption against 
retroactivity does not apply to H.R. 6116 because such a 
“jurisdiction-stripping statute usually ‘takes away no 
substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to 
hear the case.’”  Kendall I, 716 F.3d at 87 (quoting Hamdan, 





In Bason, we acknowledged that the Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands had “succeeded in developing sufficient 
institutional traditions to justify . . . direct review” by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.132  Not only have we recognized that court’s 
maturity and commended its development and jurisprudence, 
but our Third Circuit Judicial Council also recommended that 
our jurisdiction be withdrawn and that the Supreme Court of 
the Virgin Islands “enjoy the same relationship with the 
Supreme Court of the United States as do the highest courts of 
the several States.” 133   
For all the reasons that we have stated, we now hold that 
H.R. 6116 terminated our jurisdiction over all certiorari 
petitions from final decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
Virgin Islands if those petitions were filed on or after 
December 28, 2012.  Having determined that we are without 
jurisdiction to review this case, we will dismiss the petition for 
writ of certiorari. 
                                                 
 
132 Bason, 767 F.3d at 210. 
133 Third Circuit Judicial Council Report, supra note 
51, at 23. 
  
BIBAS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
The majority reads H.R. 6116 as providing that the filing of 
a certiorari petition commences a case and so deprives us of 
jurisdiction over that case. I cannot agree. Under the majority’s 
interpretation, we have certiorari jurisdiction over final judg-
ments of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands—up until the 
moment a litigant asks us to exercise that jurisdiction. That is 
not what H.R. 6116 says. 
“A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
[trial] court,” not by filing a certiorari petition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
3. The case is the entire civil action, not just the certiorari stage. 
As the majority’s legislative survey illustrates, Congress dis-
tinguishes among “cases,” “appeals,” and “writs of certiorari.” 
And it does so in statutes generally, appellate statutes, appellate 
statutes governing territorial jurisdiction, and statutes (going 
back to 1917) governing jurisdiction over the Virgin Islands. 
Nor can I agree that Bason’s reading would perpetuate our 
certiorari jurisdiction beyond the fifteen years specified by 
Congress. If H.R. 6116 applies to a case, then our jurisdiction 
over that case ends immediately. I see no way to read the stat-
ute that would preserve our jurisdiction beyond “fifteen years 
following the establishment” of the Supreme Court of the Vir-
gin Islands. 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1994). 
I would also not venture into the quicksand of legislative 
history, or speculate about legislative purpose. The text is 
clear. And stare decisis is a weighty concern, both generally 
and for litigants in the pipeline who relied on Bason. So I 
would adhere to Bason’s reading of H.R. 6116 and hold that 
we have jurisdiction here. 
I respectfully dissent. 
